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Scheler’s moral theory is often presented as a critical reaction to Kantian formalism. 
The majority of contributions on this topic deals with Scheler’s proposal of an a priori 
material ethics in contrast with the a priori formal ethics developed by Kant, or with 
the critical analysis of the eight prejudices ascribed by Scheler to Kant. a very few of 
them, however, explore their respective foundational attempts to see why such a conflict 
actually arises. This paper addresses exactly the foundational issue, trying to fulfill this 
empty space in the literature. In particular, by briefly investigating the third section of 
the groundwork of the metaphysics of moral and the doctrine of the fact of reason 
depicted by Kant in the second Critique on the one hand and the phenomenological 
theory of values elaborated by Scheler on the other hand, it will be shown that the 
disagreement between the two authors should not be ascribed to a real incompatibility, 
but rather to a different way of conceiving what the foundation of ethics actually is. 
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scheler’s attempts regarding ethics clearly emerges up to the Preface to the 
first edition of his formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of Values: a new 
attempt Toward the foundation of an ethical Personalism1: 
“to lay a foundation, not to elaborate the ways in which the discipline of ethics 
applies to all of concrete life” (Scheler 1973, Preface to the first edition, xvii). 
similarly, a few lines above, scheler explicitly mentions against whom 
his ethical theory is addressed: the Kant of the Critiques (Spader 2002). 
Therefore, in order to comprehend scheler’s ethical theory, it is necessary 
both to analyze what it means, according to scheler, to provide a foundation 
of ethics and to what extent the foundation of ethics and, more generally, 
the ethical theory depicted by scheler strictly differs from the one 
elaborated by Kant.
From the beginning of his seminal masterpiece, Scheler appears to be firmly 
convinced of what an ethical theory, aiming to be scientific and rigorous, 
should do. first of all, far from being banished only to its theoretical 
dimension, ethics should elaborate and formulate principles able to provide 
a concrete practical guidance for human actions. in the Preface to the 
second edition of the formalism scheler indeed claims that ethics is a 
“damned bloody affair, and if it can give me no directive concerning how 
I should live now in this social and historical context, then what is it?” 
(scheler 1973, Preface to the second edition, xxxi). 
moreover, in order to be a secure guidance for the actions, ethics should rest 
on roots much more robust than those on which ethics have been grounded 
so far. indeed, only by providing a robust foundation to ethics, those 
tendencies that have tried to put into question the strength of ethics such as 
moral skepticism and relativism might be definitely defeated. Agreeing with 
Kant, scheler believes that commonsense ethical theories and utilitarian 
principles cannot serve this purpose (Blosser 2002, p. 396), mainly because of 
their incapacity to ground an a priori ethics. however, differently from Kant, 
scheler rejects the idea that lawfulness might be found in the accordance 
1  from now on “formalism”.
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of the will to a formal law, the categorical imperative, and become persuaded 
that only a phenomenological theory of values might provide a robust 
foundation of ethics. 
despite the “unconditional reverence for Kant’s work” (scheler 1973, Preface 
to the first edition, xvii) and, in the meantime, the idea that Kant is right in 
rejecting goods and purposes-based ethics for their inevitable a posteriori nature 
(Scheler 1973, p.45), Scheler rejects some “assumptions” (Scheler 1973, pp. 6-7) 
lying behind Kant’s ethics. among them, he particularly opposes to the one 
affirming the dichotomical relationship between reason and sensibility2 and to 
what follows, within Kantian ethics, from the acceptance of this distinction: the 
identification of the a priori with the rational and the formal on the one hand and 
of the a posteriori with the sensible and the material on the other hand (ibidem). 
Following the critique of sensualism put forward to Kant by Husserl, Scheler finds 
the roots of this fundamental mistake in the fact that Kant sensualizes feelings 
(Zhang 2011, p. 147). By excluding Brentano’s distinction between feelings of lower 
level and feelings of higher level, and by believing that feeling has nothing to do 
with the foundation of ethics, Kant cannot but conceive the “rational feeling” as 
an inconsistency. on the contrary, as the title of his masterpiece clearly suggests, 
scheler’s aim is to show that a material ethics that is in the meanwhile a priori is 
possible. actually, scheler’s main thesis is not only that an a priori material ethics 
is possible, but also that only by grounding ethics on matter the a priori nature of 
ethics would be eventually safeguarded. 
Beside the observation that rational feelings might actually exist (and, 
therefore, that Kant’s denial of them constitutes a robust mistake), scheler 
adds that by excluding matter from moral domain, Kant cannot grasp the 
overall dimension of morality. in other words, according to scheler, the Kantian 
ambition of a universal ethics is immediately broken off by the exclusion of 
feelings from the moral domain. indeed, even if we agreed with Kant that 
feelings cannot be those kind of things on which ethics might rest, they would 
seem otherwise to fulfill a very important role in moral experience. Therefore, 
by entirely excluding them from moral domain, Kant is excluding per se his own 
demand of a universal ethics in favor of a partial based-ethics. 
At this point, an answer to the following question seems unavoidable to move on: 
provided that it might be intuitively true that the sphere of feelings has something 
to do with morality, on what elements a material a priori ethics might be grounded?
2  As some authors (see for example A. Da Re, Filosofia Morale. Storia, teorie, argomenti, 
Bruno Mondadori, 2008) have properly suggested, Kant takes inspiration from the dualistic 
anthropological conception elaborated by hume. however, differently from hume who awarded 
the primacy to sensibility, Kant inverted the Humean trade off, finally ascribing to Reason the 
central core of his ethical system. 
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although scheler immediately claims to owe to husserl regarding both the 
phenomenological method he adopts and concept of the intentionality of 
consciousness he makes use of, nonetheless, from the very beginning, he 
feels not bound to the way in which the latter has developed these ideas. 
The main contribution made by husserl in this respect was to demonstrate 
that consciousness is always intentional, meaning that it is not an empty 
concept but it is always consciousness of something. moreover, according to 
husserl, this ‘something’ towards which consciousness is directed is always 
an a priori content, and, more precisely, an essence. Because of that, husserl 
speaks of “eidetic consciousness”, since these a priori contents or ‘facts’ are 
pure facts existing independently of their instantiation in objects. 
starting from husserl’s phenomenological reduction, scheler develops more 
radical considerations. among them, the central one is that the process 
of phenomenological reduction is not a mere cognitive process. on the 
contrary, the very acts of “idealization” and “derealization” of the world 
and the Ego, involve the entirety of person (Scheler 2009). Differently from 
husserl who recognizes the importance of feelings but, in the end, 
accords the primacy to the logical-theoretical3, scheler claims  
that the content of consciousness is primarily a material content. more 
precisely, consciousness ‘intentions’ axiological qualities or values that 
might be grasped only through a direct intuition, not through a logical and 
intellectual process. in scheler’s words, 
“value-ception […] precedes all representational acts according to an 
essential law of origins. its evidence is largely independent of the evidence 
of representations” (Scheler 1973, p. 201). 
“any intellectual comprehension of what something is presupposes an 
emotive value experience of the object […] Value-ception always precedes 
perception” (Scheler 1973, p. 109). 
moreover, scheler criticizes husserl’s assumption (considering his as a platonic) 
according to which essences or, in scheler’s words “values”, exist as something 
in themselves, independently from their instantiation in objects. according to 
scheler, there is a distinction but also a strong relationship between values and 
the sensible things in which the values are embedded – the goods. While values 
are a priori and objective, goods are a posteriori and relative. however, despite 
3  as Blosser suggests, this is because husserl believes that “the acts of willing and feeling 
are ‘founded’ in intellective acts and grasped only by means of the intellect’s predicative acts of 
thematization and objectivisation” (p. 396).
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these two entities deeply differ, values are not independent from goods in the 
sense that the only way for a value to be grasped is by grasping the good in 
which the value is instantiated (scheler 1973, p. 19). like colors, values actually 
exist only when realized in their bearers. 
To say that the perception of values cannot be but an emotional perception 
means, for scheler, that the a priori is not imposed to consciousness by 
reason, but “it is given in intuition”, where, by this expression, scheler 
means that it is “phenomenologically experienced”. if the perception 
of values is grounded on an emotional a priori and if we accept that the 
sphere of emotions and values might be a priori, then the perception 
of values is the perception of something objective. however, scheler’s 
proposal goes a little bit further, because his attempt is not only to show 
that the material is objective and a priori, but also that values arrange 
themselves in an objective order of relationships. in other words, 
according to scheler, values are hierarchically disposed. ranked from 
lowest to highest, these include: sensory values, vital values, cultural 
values, and, at the top, religious values (Scheler 1973, p. 20). 
To conclude, ethics, from scheler’s perspective, rests on a material content 
– the values – that is, in the meantime, an a priori content. This content is 
not perceivable independently from  the thing in which it is embedded, and it 
is given to consciousness through an emotional experience. ethics is therefore 
grounded because it rests on a hierarchy of absolute and objective values that 
anyone might perceive, and that is both able to bound judgments and to provide a 
practical guidance for the actions. 
The expression “foundation of ethics” with respect to Kant might appear 
rather misleading. Indeed, Kant tries to ground his ethics twice: first of 
all in the third section of the groundwork of the metaphysics of moral (from 
now on gmS) and, later, in the seventh paragraph of the analytic of The 
Critique of Practical reason (from now on KpV). Both these attempts will be 
discussed in the next paragraph. Traditionally, the relationship between the 
two attempts is explained as follows: in the KpV Kant would correct what 
affirmed in the former work, since what claimed in the third section of the 
latter now appears to him as a vicious circle4. even if we did not consider 
appropriate such an interpretation, it seems however undeniable that the 
4  see for example: allison h., Kant’s Theory of freedom, Cambridge University Press, 1990; 
ameriks K., Kant’s deduction of freedom and morality, in “Journal of the history of Philosophy”, 19, 
1981; Beck l.w., a commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical reason, The university of chicago Press, 
Chicago 1963; Heinrich D., Schulz W., Volkman-Schluck K.-H. (by), der Begriff des sittlichen einsicht 
und Kants lehre vom faktum der Vernunft, in die geganwart der griechen in neuren denken, Tubingen 
1960, pp. 77-155; McCarthy M.H., Kant’s rejection of the argument of the “groundwork” iii, in “Kant-
studien”, 73, 1982. 
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foundation of ethics provided in the work of 1788 represents an inversion 
of what previously affirmed. indeed, whereas the aim of gmS iii is exactly to 
provide a deduction of the categorical imperative, highlighting its condition 
of possibility, in the KpV he claims that moral law cannot be demonstrated 
through a deductive reasoning. given that, most commentators believe that 
the relationship between the two works might be better explained in terms 
of a breech rather than a progression5.
Kant’s main purpose in the gmS was to ground the supreme principle 
of morality on its condition of possibility, the autonomy, so to infer 
the existence of the former from the existence of the latter. however, 
the effective way in which such an attempt was carried out varied a lot 
from Kant’s first plan. The impossibility of demonstrating the existence 
of autonomy entailed also the impossibility of demonstrating the 
existence of the moral law, and, consequently, the necessity to obey to its 
command. The only way in which such an obligation could be recovered 
is by introducing the perspective of reason, beside the one of sensibility, 
and to highlight the superiority of the former over the latter. This last 
consideration grounds its roots in the Kantian belief of the superiority 
of the so defined “intelligible world” over the “sensible world”. The 
intelligible world is superior, according to Kant, to the sensible world since 
the former is the condition of possibility of the latter, meaning that the 
sensible world is grounded in the intelligible world. however, the belief 
that the roots of the sensible world might be founded in the intelligible 
world, seems in turn to be grounded in the Kantian belief that man as an 
intelligible being is superior to man as a sensible being. 
The clear circularity of this argument showed to the Kant of the gmS the 
impossibility of further justifying the obligation in the moral law. The only 
‘certainty’ which might be grasped at the end of the gmS was hence that 
“we do not indeed comprehend the practical unconditional necessity 
of the moral imperative, but we nevertheless comprehend its 
incomprehensibility; and this is all that can fairly be required of a 
philosophy that strives in its principles to the very boundary of human 
reason” (Kant 1785, p. 66).
5  See references in note n.20. In particular, Ameriks affirms that in the work of 1788 Kant 
seems to have completely changed his mind and substituted its initial project of providing the 
categorical imperative with a transcendental deduction with the new consideration that the 
moral law is an a priori fact of reason, starting from which also the existence of freedom might 
be inferred.
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The arrival point of the gmS – that the justification of the obligation of 
moral law lies in the assumption of an alleged intuition of man as a rational 
being – appears completely exceeded up to the first rows of the KpV. here 
Kant indeed claims that the theoretical demonstration of autonomy is 
unnecessary in order to demonstrate the existence of moral law. The 
explanation he provides is the belief that the foundation of ethics does 
not rest anymore in the intuition of the noumenic nature of man, but in 
the consideration of moral law as the fact of reason. hence, in order to 
understand of what kind the foundation provided by Kant is, the analysis of 
the fact of reason seems unavoidable. 
The Kantian theory of the fact of reason is formulated in the notation 
following the seventh paragraph of the analytic of Pure Practical reason: 
 “we may call the consciousness of this fundamental law a fact of reason, 
because we cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason, e.g., the 
consciousness of freedom (for this is not antecedent five), but it forces 
itself on us as a synthetic a priori proposition, which is not based on any 
intuition, either pure or empirical. […] however, when we regard this law 
as given, it must be observed, in order not to fall into any misconception, 
that it is not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of pure reason, which 
thereby announces itself as originally legislative (sic volo, sic jubeo)” (Kant 
1788, p. 23).
As some commentators have properly suggested, the difficulty to define 
what the fact of reason means, is further due to the ambiguity of Kant’s 
words (Beck 1963). Beck, for example, claims that the expression “fact” 
appears eight times in the KpV with three different meanings: the 
consciousness of the moral law, the moral law itself and autonomy. now, 
since, according to Kant, moral law and autonomy can be considered as 
the same thing, the fact of reason might be either the moral law or the 
consciousness of the moral law. Both these solutions seem problematic. 
indeed by considering the fact of reason as the moral law, it remains 
undemonstrated how to assure its existence and validity. on the other hand, 
considering the fact of reason only as the consciousness of the moral law 
means that no further steps have been done in the epistemology of morality 
since it cannot be excluded that moral law is only a chimaera. given that, 
according to Beck, the first option is the more plausible one. Once (at least 
provisionally) established that the fact of reason is the moral law, another 
question needs an explanation: whether the moral law is a Fact for pure 
reason, or a fact of pure reason. since the former interpretation would entail 
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the consideration of the fact of reason as a pure intuition (which is excluded 
by Kant himself in his presentation of the fact of reason reported above), 
the second interpretation is the one that should be followed. 
However, what does it mean that the moral law is a Fact of Reason? What does 
it entail for the foundation of ethics? Starting from what affirmed by Tomasi 
(Tomasi 1991), my claim is that the existence and validity of the moral law 
seems to be explainable only by showing how reason establishes itself, which 
has been here interpreted as a reflective act. In other words, an answer to the 
question why moral law is binding might be found in the reflexive nature of the 
rational faculty. This can be shown also through etymology: moral law is not a 
datum but a factum, e.g. something that constructs itself. Through a self-reflective 
action, reason becomes aware of its nature and functioning. in particular, 
what reason discovers is that moral law is not something different from 
reason, but it is a product of pure reason in its practical dimension. The only 
fact of reason is therefore that pure reason appears to human will as originally 
legislative, meaning that the determination of the will by pure reason is seen 
as a constriction, an obligation, by the will itself. This happens because man’s 
will is good, but not holy. whereas a holy will is naturally in harmony with the 
law, acting by its own nature in accordance with its legislative form, a finite 
will (the man’s will) is not per se in accordance with it. That’s why moral law 
appears to human will as an imperative. Thus understood, Kant’s justification 
of the supreme principle of morality6, far from being a logical deduction, seems 
to be the very act of showing the reasons why the adherence of the will to pure 
reason is considered, by man’s will, as an obligation. 
Most commentators find in the contrast between a material a priori and a 
formal a priori the aspect upon which scheler and Kant mainly disagree. 
The claim I have tried to endorse here goes a little bit further. It affirms 
that the roots of their incompatibility should not be found uniquely in the 
question of whether there is something like an emotional a priori, but in 
the way in which such an a priori, either formal or material, is, from time 
to time, justified. The thesis I tried to support here is that in order to see 
to what extent scheler’s moral proposal differs from Kant’s one, it seems 
necessary to look at the roots of this disagreement, that is to their different 
foundational attempts. Because of that, the two different proposals have 
been here reported and analyzed. 
By respectively comparing their endeavors, it clearly emerges that whereas 
6  Through the criticism of the rational faculty Kant is able to ground moral law and 
autonomy, which is moral law if we consider that a will subdued to moral law and autonomy are 
equivalent for Kant.
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Scheler’s attempt might be appropriately defined in terms of a foundation, 
Kant’s theory of the fact of reason might be described more easily in 
terms of a construction. indeed, if we consider the term ‘foundation’ in its 
traditional meaning of deducing something from something else, whereas 
scheler tries to deduce the objectivity of ethics from the absoluteness of 
values, Kant’s final effort seems to pursue another direction. This fact might 
appear as a contingency. on the contrary my thesis argues exactly for the 
opposite, or that there is a clear motivation for such a change. indeed one 
could say that Kantian recantation of a foundational attempt in its logical 
definition might be ascribed to the fact that the act of deducing both the 
existence and the validity of the moral law from the existence of autonomy 
in the gmS iii has failed. however, at the beginning of the KpV, Kant makes a 
very different claim, according to which a deductive argument cannot play 
any more a role in the foundation of morality. in other words, through the 
elaboration of the fact of reason, Kant seems to show the impossibility to 
ground ethics on something different than reason itself and external to it. 
The interpretation of the fact of reason which has been here endorsed, is 
the one that affirms that grounding moral law means to exhibit those proofs 
that could show why man’s finite will perceives the accordance of the will 
to the form of the law as an obligation. Together with what has been already 
affirmed in support of it, a final remark seems important. Kant could not 
have accepted the equation of foundation with deduction also because of 
he rejects material content from pure moral domain. By excluding any 
kind of material content from moral domain (remind that material content 
implies immediately sensibility, according to Kantian perspective), Kant 
cannot ground morality upon anything but reason and, in particular upon 
the self-reflective constitution of Reason. On the contrary, having included 
some contents as part of moral domain (rather, having considered material 
content as the central core of morality) has allowed scheler to carry out a 
secure and trusted ‘foothold’ upon which ethics might be grounded. 
However, the question whether there is actually something robust on which 
to ground moral obligation, in other words whether the appeal to a material 
content is really justified, is something that needs further investigation. 
NOT KANT Vs. sCHeleR, bUT eITHeR KANT OR sCHeleR. 
fROM CONsTRUCTION TO fOUNDATION Of eTHICs
Virginia sanchini IEO - Istituto Europeo di Oncologia; Università Statale di Milano
151
REFERENCES 
Allison, H. (1990), Kant’s Theory of freedom, cambridge university Press, 
cambridge; 
ameriks, K. (1981), “Kant’s deduction of freedom and morality”, Journal of the 
history of Philosophy, 19, pp. 53-79;
Beck, L.W. (1963), a commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical reason, The 
university of chicago Press, chicago; 
Blosser, P. (2002), “Max Scheler: A Sketch of His Moral Philosophy”, in Drummond J., 
embree l. (eds.), Phenomenological approaches to moral Philosophy: a handbook, Kluwer 
academic Publishers, dordrecht pp. 391-413;
Da Re, A. (2008), Filosofia Morale. Storia, teorie, argomenti, Bruno mondadori, 
milano;
Heinrich, D., Schulz, W. Volkman-Schluck K.-H. (by) (1960), der Begriff des 
sittlichen einsicht und Kants lehre vom faktum der Vernunft, in die geganwart der 
griechen in neuren denken, Tubingen, pp. 77-155;
Kant, i. (1785), grundlegung zur metaphysik der Sitten, (eng.tr.) groundwork of the 
metaphysics of morals, cambridge university Press, cambridge-new york, 1997;
Kant, i. (1788), Kritik der Praktishen Vernunft, (eng.tr.) The Critique of Practical 
reason, Wilder Publications, 2008;
mccarthy, m.h. (1982), “Kant’s rejection of the argument of the 
“groundwork” iii”, Kant-Studien, 73, pp.1-4;
scheler, m. (1973), formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of Values: a 
new attempt Toward the foundation of an ethical Personalism, northwestern 
university Press;
Scheler, M. (2009), The human place in the cosmos, northwestern university 
Press; 
Spader, P.H. (2002), Scheler ethical personalism: its logic, development and promise, 
fordham university Press;
Tomasi, g. (1991), identità razionale e moralità. Studio sulla fondazione della 
metafisica dei costumi di I. Kant, Verifiche, Trento;
Zhang, W. (2011), “Rational a priori or Emotional a priori? Husserl and Scheler’s 
criticisms of Kant regarding the foundation of ethics”, Cultura. international 
Journal of Philosophy of Culture and axiology 8(2): 143–158.
NOT KANT Vs. sCHeleR, bUT eITHeR KANT OR sCHeleR. 
fROM CONsTRUCTION TO fOUNDATION Of eTHICs
Virginia sanchini IEO - Istituto Europeo di Oncologia; Università Statale di Milano
